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Abstract 
In theory the imposition of capital controls could increase the firms’ cost of capital, curb 
investment, and hence cause a drop in the share prices. Further, the credit constraints 
created by the imposition of capital controls are also more likely to be binding for firms 
that depend heavily on external rather on internal finance.  
This dissertation evaluates the effects of capital controls on the Cypriot stock market on 
two fronts. Particularly, the study examines, using monthly time-series data, the effects 
of capital controls on the market capitalization (its level, absolute, and percentage 
changes) of the Cypriot stock exchange. The study also, using daily data, looks at the 
effects of capital controls on the daily index value, actual returns, and cumulative re-
turns, of the Cypriot stock market general index.  
The effect of capital controls is examined within the framework of event-study analysis, 
where the study’s “event window” is defined as the period under which the Cypriot 
economy was under the influence of capital controls, that is, over the period spanning 
from March 2013 to April 2015. The “estimation window” of the analysis runs for an 
equal number of months prior and after the period of capital controls.  
The empirical evidence do not point to any significant decline in cumulative abnormal 
returns for Cypriot stock market following the imposition of capital controls in March 
2015, and for as long they remained in place. The general conclusion that can be derived 
from the study’s empirical findings is that that Cypriot stock exchange was largely unaf-
fected by the imposition of capital controls.  
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Preface 
In the past, many Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and advanced economies had to 
weather the potentially harmful effects of capital outflows on the economy’s growth 
record, and, in general, on the stability of the financial system. The most well-known 
examples are the cases of Argentina (over the period 2001–2002), Iceland (2008), and 
Ukraine (2008). Predominantly, capital outflows have to do with developments in the 
domestic market.  For example, a currency crisis developed in Argentina due to the fact 
that the economy’s macroeconomic policies, which were in place, were largely unsus-
tainable; in Iceland an overly-growth banking sector collapsed thus causing large capital 
outflows; In Ukraine the weak management of the macroeconomic brought about a 
banking and currency crisis.  
There is also the possibility that such outflows could be down to global causes (like for 
example a sudden shift in the global investors’ risk appetite or changes in interest rates), 
which lie outside the control of the country. However, the cases of Cyprus (2013) and 
Greece (2015) made quite clear how much the mal-management of the domestic econ-
omy will eventually trigger, in an era of open capital markets, the domestic residents’ 
need to channel their funds abroad, into “safety” and away from the economically pre-
carious domestic environment.  
The effectiveness of capital controls on outflows is judged on the ground of whether 
they put an end in the drainage of capital. So, it seems that the basic precondition for 
the effectiveness of constraints on capital outflows is for consistent (and sound) macro-
economic policies to be in place. For example, in the case of Argentina (2001–2002) and 
Ukraine (2008) where the fiscal policy was inconsistent with exchange-rate-regime pol-
icy), the controls imposed on capital did not make much of a difference.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter begins with some background information of the dissertation’s topic 
(Section 1.1), i.e. historical information on the imposition of capital controls in both Cy-
prus and Greece. Then, it goes with the discussion of the study’s main research question 
(Section 1.2), and it ends with the presentation of the dissertations’ structure (Section 
1.3).   
1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
In their most general form, capital controls involve financial measures taken by the gov-
ernment or the country’s Central Bank as to limit capital inflows into and/or outflows 
from the domestic economy. There are extraordinary measures taken by a country's 
banking system as a measure to be protected by a looming bank run on its deposits (see 
Magud et al, 2011).   
These measures can be applied either to the whole economy or to specific sectors (for 
example the financial sector, or to some strategically important industries). They can 
also be applied either to all capital flows, or they can be differentiated by the type of 
capital flow (e.g. loans, equity investments) or the duration of the capital flow (short-
term, medium-term, long-term flows). Capital controls can greatly affect the financial 
performance of a country, since they afflict various classes of assets such as stocks, 
bonds, foreign exchange transactions, import duties products and the level of exports. 
Finally, capital controls can be imposed either on inflows or outflows.  
There are several reasons that may prompt the residents and investors, alike, in a coun-
try to start wanting to channel their funds outside the country (see Forbes and Warnock 
(2011)). To begin with, a deterioration (due to, perhaps, a random shock) of the coun-
try’s terms of trade could give rise to depreciation expectations. Another reason, could 
be the application of an inconsistent macroeconomic policy, which eventually calls for a 
macroeconomic adjustment as a policy response. In this case the implementation of 
capital-control measures may be for the required macroeconomic adjustment to take 
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place. Finally, capital outflows could be the result of a sagging confidence in the coun-
try’s financial system, or the result of global changes, like for example, an increase in 
investors’ risk aversion (and an “appetite” for the safety of advanced economies) or a 
restrictive monetary policy in the main advanced economies.   
 
Capital-control outflows were imposed in both Cyprus and Greece, and this decision 
was a result of the debt crisis as well of political decision making.  The imposition of 
capital controls in Greece and Cyprus did not aim to stabilize the countries’ balance of 
payments or to protect the loss of foreign-exchange reserves, rather it was a temporary 
measure (in the case of Cyprus) aiming at curtailing deposit outflows and safeguarding 
the domestic financial system stability. 
Some of these capital-control measures involved the following  
• Increased transaction taxes. 
• Withdrawal limits from the ATMs. 
• Limited access to bank accounts for both individuals and businesses. 
• Control in the export and import activity. 
• Prohibition of early withdrawals from time deposits.  
• Checks over a certain amount of money could not be redeemed; bank checks 
were redeemable however. 
• Limited use of credit / debit cards within the country. 
• Limits on transactions with foreign sector. 
 
 
1.2 AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In theory, the imposition of capital controls is expected to increase the cost of 
capital and hence reduce private-sector investment. Further, the credit con-
straints are expected to be quite restraining for firms relying too much debt 
capital for financing their operations.  However, firms that can more easily 
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access debt capital at low cost may be able to weather the limitations barriers 
brought about by the imposition of capital controls.  
To this end, the aim of this dissertation is to explore the impact of the imposi-
tion of the capital controls in the cases of Cyprus and Greece.  Particularly, we 
want to examine how the stock market in these two countries reacted, and in 
which of the two the impact was stronger and why.   
The main hypothesis of the dissertation is the following: “The imposition of 
capital controls adversely affected the stock markets in Greece and Cyprus.  
To investigate the specific hypothesis, we rely on an event study around the 
date of announcement of the capital control measures, focusing on the effect 
of these measure of aggregate stock-price indices. If the research hypothesis 
holds, then we should expect statistically significant decline in cumulative ab-
normal stock-market returns, in the wake of the imposition of capital controls.  
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Capital controls limit the unrestricted international flow of capital. They can be imposed 
either on capital inflows, through taxation, whenever these flows tend to appreciate the 
international value of the domestic currency, thereby reducing exports, or on capital 
outflows, through limitations on withdrawals or remittances. At any rate, the affect the 
country’s capital-account (Section 2.1).  
According to financial theory the liberalization of capital flows leads to a reduction of 
their costs, while financial systems, through free competition, do gain in flexibility and 
efficiency. "Open capital (and money) markets" essentially ensure the discipline on the 
part of national governments, which are forced to align their fiscal spending plans with 
the demands of the markets, otherwise they will face high costs for their sovereign 
bonds.  
2.1 THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS  
Capital controls essentially are imposed on components of the country’s capital account, 
which is part of its balance of payment.  
A country’s capital account records the transactions (i.e. purchases and sales) by its res-
idents on physical assets (for example factories and property) and financial assets (for 
example government securities and equities).  Table 1-2 presents the five basic compo-
nents of a country’s capital account. These components are (a) the private foreign direct 
investments (FDI); (b) private loans; (c) private portfolio investments; (d) governmental 
and multilateral flows; and (e) residential transfers.   
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Table 1: The Components of the Capital Account  
CAPITAL ACCOUNT COMPONENT  
Description 
A. PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Purchases by Japanese of US real es-
tate (+) 
Investment in plant expansion in Ohio by 
Honda (+) 
New investment in a German chemical 
plant (-) 
B. PRIVATE LOANS 
Foreign loans by private international 
banks (+) 
 
C. PRIVATE PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS 
Purchases by the French of IBM stock 
(+) 
Deposits in Swiss banks by Americans (-
) 
Purchases of Japanese stocks and 
bonds (-) 
D. GOVERNMENT AND MULTILATERAL 
FLOWS 
 
D1. Loans 
Purchases of US Treasury bonds by 
Bank of Japan (+) 
A World Bank Loan (+) 
 
D2. Grants  
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D3. Debt Amortization 
Gradual reduction of the principle on for-
mer loans (-) 
 
E. RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL OUTFLOW 
Wealthy LDC nationals, who sent vast 
amounts of money into developed-nation bank 
accounts, stock and bond purchases, and real es-
tate (-) 
 
 
The capital account essentially captures the difference between capital inflows, and cap-
ital outflows.  Capital inflows result from the sale of assets to foreigners, while capital 
outflows involve the purchase of assets from foreigners.  
So capital inflows correspond to increases in domestic liabilities, while capital outflows 
correspond to an increase of domestic assets abroad. Specifically, the change in the for-
eign assets (FA) held by the domestic private sector represent the private capital out-
flows, and the change in the foreign assets held by the public sector stand for the gov-
ernment capital outflows (the latter is the change in the official foreign reserves of the 
government sector. Likewise, the change in the foreign liabilities (FL) of the domestic 
private held by the foreigners represent the private capital inflows, while the change in 
the foreign liabilities of the public sector stand for the government capital inflows.  If a 
country’s net foreign assets are positive, this means that the country is a creditor coun-
try, while if net foreign assets are negative, the country is a debtor country.  
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2.2 THE LITERATURE ON THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CAPITAL INFLOWS   
The literature on the restrictions placed on capital inflows has shown ( for example see 
Ariyoshi et al 2000; Baba and Kokenyne 2011; and Magud et al., 2011) that such re-
strictions ease the pressure on the domestic currency to appreciate, give the monetary 
authorities the freedom for the conduct of a relatively more free monetary policy, and 
(as expected) shift the composition of capital inflows in the direction of investments 
with lower maturities. Furthermore, a particular study (see Binici et al (2010)) docu-
mented that restrictions on capital outflows turned out to be more effective when they 
are imposed by an advanced economy than by a less advanced economy; the reason for 
this has to do with the improved institutional and regulatory environment advanced 
economies enjoy relatively to less advanced economies.  
2.2.1 The Study of Alfaro et al. (2014) 
Alfaro et al. (2014), using of quarterly data over the period 2006/Q1- 2012/Q4, assessed 
the effects of capital controls on firm-level stock returns and real investment in Brazil.  
Brazil imposed controls on the capital inflows with the purpose to contain the sustained 
increase in the international value of its currency. The Brazilian economy grew consist-
ently during the 2000s, as commodity prices surged, and Brazil being a main commodity-
export nation. The boom in commodity prices was accompanied by increased capital 
inflows, thereby putting upward pressures on the Brazilian Real (BRL). Indeed, the ex-
change rate USD/BRL, in 2008, traded at 1.6 BRL to USD, while four year ago, that is, in 
2004, it had reached a high of 3.1 BRL the USD. The Brazilian government in order to 
restrict the excessive capital inflows into the country, and the stabilize the exchange rate 
(USD/BRL) from further dropping (i.e. in order to avert a further strengthening of the 
Brazilian currency), introduced, in March 2008, controls on capital inflows, by imposing 
a financial-transactions tax of 1.5% incoming foreign fixed-income investments. Despite 
these controls the appreciation of the Real kept on, and as of the end of end of October 
2010, the tax on capital inflows for fixed-income investment reached 6%. However, as 
of December 2011, the financial tax of 2% capital inflows for equities was ditched. 
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The authors, within the framework an event-study methodology, estimated an econo-
metric model where the dependent variable was the cumulative abnormal return on the 
stock of firm i over the event window t.  The empirical results of the study revealed that 
across all events, a significant (at the 1% level of significance) average decline in stock 
returns was observed to the tune of 0.43% over a two-day window (surrounding the 
capital control announcements).  
Controlling for the effect of firm size (with the size variable measured by the lagged value 
of total firm assets), the authors found that the cumulative abnormal returns fall on 
average by statistically-significant 3.39%. Since the coefficient on the control variable 
for firm size was positive, this implies that for large firms the effect of capital-control 
announcements on their cumulative abnormal returns was less.   Controlling for the ef-
fect of the firm being an exporting company, the average decline in abnormal cumulative 
stock returns was 3.48%.  
The authors found a significant decline in cumulative abnormal returns for Brazilian 
firms following the imposition of capital controls in 2008-2009. Conditioning on firm-
characteristics such as firm size and export status, the empirical evidence revealed that 
large firms and the largest exporting firms were less affected by the controls.  
Firms that are more dependent on external finance are however more adversely af-
fected by the controls. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that capital con-
trols increase market uncertainty and reduce the availability of external finance, which 
in tur lowers investment at the firm-level. 
 
2.3 THE LITERATURE ON THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CAPITAL OUTFLOWS 
The main objective of placing restrictions on capital outflows is to mitigate the tendency 
for capital outflows from the country.   
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2.3.1 Various Case Studies  
The literature on the effects of controls on capital outflows involves, as it is expected, a 
significant number of case studies, carried out within the framework of event-study 
methodology. In a relatively recent survey of literature by Magud et al. (2011), it was 
shown that controls on capital outflows have a limited effectiveness, in stemming the 
domestic capital from flowing abroad, barring Malaysia back in 1998. 
 
2.3.2 The Study of Saborowski et al. (2014) 
Saborowski et al. (2014), using a sample of 37 emerging market economies, over the 
period 1995Q1-2010Q4, examined the effectiveness of the imposition of restrictions on 
capital outflows on reversing net capital outflows, and on stabilizing the country’s ex-
change rate and interest rate stabilization, thereby allowing monetary authorities a 
greater monetary-policy independence.  
The authors made use of a panel vector autoregression approach, where the endoge-
nous variables were (1) an outflow control index, (2) net assets as a percent of GDP, (3) 
the interest rate, (4) the inflation rate, (5) the local currency/USD exchange rate, and (6) 
the net capital flows (either inflows or outflows) as a percent of GDP.  
The empirical results of the study revealed that measures of capital-outflow tightening 
are effective if they are implemented within a framework of sound macroeconomic fun-
damentals or good institutions, or capital-outflow restrictions were already in place 
(that is, when the value of the outflow control index was already relatively high at the 
time of application of the capital controls on outflows). If these conditions are not met, 
then a tightening of capital-outflows restrictions fails to reduce net capital outflows from 
the country, due to a sizeable reduction in gross inflows.  So, if countries with sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals or strong institutions impose restrictions on capital out-
flows, this will eventual indeed lead to an important drop of net capital outflows from 
the country.  
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2.3.3 The Study of Paricha et al. (2015) 
Pasricha et al. (2015) examined, on the one hand, whether capital controls can be em-
ployed to manage the macroeconomy, and, on the other hand, if they could for macro-
economic policy purpose, how these controls would affect the capital flows in the econ-
omy. In addition, the authors examined the spillover effects of capital control actions by 
the major EMEs.  
The original sample of the study consisted of 21 EMEs, which comprise the MSCI Emerg-
ing Markets Index, along with Argentina. Then, three central and eastern European 
countries were excluded from the sample (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), 
since, according to the authors, the capital control measures they took since 2001 were 
mainly down to the process of accession into the EU. Additionally, two other countries, 
specifically Taiwan and Morocco, were excluded from the sample due data limitations. 
As a result, the final sample included 17 countries observed over the period 2001/Q1 το 
2011Q4. 
The endogenous variables of (the baseline) model included, the following variables, at 
quarterly frequency: 
• net inflow tightening.  
• net outflow easing measures. 
• The spot exchange rate against the US dollar. 
• A monetary-policy autonomy measure.  
• a capital flow variable. 
The first two variables captured the capital-control measures taken by the governments, 
and these measures aimed at restricting both the capital inflows and the capital out-
flows. The spot exchange rate involved the quarterly change of the spot exchange rate 
of the local currency vis-à-vis the US dollar, and hence an increase in the value of the 
exchange rate implied an appreciation (depreciation) of the dollar (domestic currency) 
vis-à-vis the domestic currency (dollar). The measure of monetary policy autonomy that 
was used was the Aizenman-Chinn-Ito index of Monetary Policy Autonomy, an index- 
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computed as the reciprocal of the within-quarter correlation of the interest rates be-
tween the home country and the base country (i.e. the US), using daily data for money 
market interest rates. A monetary policy autonomy corresponds to a higher level of the 
index, which, by construction, can fluctuate between 0 and 1.  
The capital flow variable included all capital flows excluding FDI and transactions for 
monetary authority and genera government in the “other investment” category 
The exogenous variables of the model included the following variables  
• The global real GDP growth,  
• The increase in the S&P 500 index,  
• The US inflation rate  
• A dummy for quantitative easing in the U.S.  
• A dummy for the global financial 
 
2.4 CASE STUDIES OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON OUTFLOWS  
2.4.1 The Case of Iceland  
In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2007-08, Iceland experienced the collapse of 
its three largest commercial banks, all of which were burdened with short-term foreign 
liabilities, to the tune of 600% of GDD (see Saborowski et al. (2014)).  
The turmoil caused by the aforementioned event, prompted a wave of panic capital out-
flows, which, as expected, put significant downward pressures on the domestic cur-
rency. As a result, the government of Iceland, in November 2008, decided to impose 
comprehensive restrictions on capital outflows from the country in an effort to stabilize 
the international value of the domestic currency. The measures taken involved re-
strictions on capital transactions applied to residents and nonresidents alike, like for ex-
ample the banning on the movement of capital. No restrictions were placed however on 
foreign exchange transactions needed to be carried out within framework of external-
trade activities.  
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2.4.2 The Case of Ukraine  
The impact of the 2007-2008 financial manifested in Ukraine through a collapse in its 
exports, a sharp deterioration of its terms of trade, and a wave massive capital outflows. 
As a result, the country’s Central Bank, as to reduce the wave of capital outflows and 
stabilize the exchange rate of the hryvnia (Ukraine’s domestic currency), imposed ex-
change-rate restrictions and a 5-day waiting period for non-residents wishing to convert 
their domestic-currency-denominated proceeds on their local investments into foreign 
currency. But despite the application of tightening measures on capital outflows, 
Ukraine’s stock of international reserves dropped by 30 percent six months in the wake 
of the exchange restrictions.  
2.4.3 The Case of Cyprus  
The roadmap of the Cypriot debt crisis and the ensuing capital controls involved two 
landmarks.  
The first one was back in 2011, in the midst of the debate on the Greek PSI, Cyprus takes 
a hit from the explosion in its the naval base "Evangelos Florakis", which resulted in pe-
cuniary losses to the tune of €1.5 billion; that was a huge amount, considering the fact 
that the size of the Cypriot GDP in 2011 was stood at €20.2 billion. The second landmark 
involved the Greek PSI per se. Cypriot banks having a large exposure to Greek govern-
ment bonds, took a heavy blow from the restructuring of the Greek debt, losing in total, 
close to 4.5 billion euros on the Greek bonds they held in their books, amounting to 25% 
of the GDP of Cyprus. 
Then following the downgrades of Cyprus' credit rating, the yield on its 10-year bond 
climbed above 12%, thereby rendering any funding from the markets highly prohibitive. 
Finally, after receiving € 2.5 billion a loan of from Russia, at an interest rate of about 
4.5%, Cyprus officially asked Europeans for help.  
In the meantime, the banking crisis in Cyprus had peaked with the closure of the banks 
between March 16 and 28, 2013. During that period, and specifically until Friday, March 
22, the daily cash withdrawal limit from Cypriot banks was set at €500, and then from 
that Friday onward, due to a lack of liquidity, the daily withdrawal limit was lowered to 
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a mere €260 for all banks. On Sunday afternoon (24/3/2013), at the time when a critical 
Eurogroup meeting was taking, the daily withdrawal limit from the ATMs of the Central 
Bank of Cyprus was limited to €100.  
The €10-billion bailout package presented to Cypriot authorities, on 25th of March, 2013 
came with strings attached.  The first involved the imposition of capital controls, which 
were finally lifted on 6 th of April 2015, when Cyprus returned to normality after two 
years and having diligently implemented a major fiscal adjustment program.  The capital 
controls in imposed in Cyprus involved the following measures  
• The amount of cash withdrawals from the deposit accounts were restricted  to € 
300. 
• Cypriot citizens traveling abroad could hold a limited amount of funds, up to 
2000 euros. 
• Cypriot students studying abroad were allowed to receive up to 5000 euros per 
quarter. 
• The export of currency was forbidden for the sole purpose of foreign invest-
ments. 
• Checks on sight deposits were only used for deposits in the payee's name. 
• Time deposits that expired in the next month following the implementation of 
restrictions were extended for at least one month and only a part of them could 
then be transferred to a checking account. 
• A monthly ceiling of € 5000 was imposed on remittances. 
• It is forbidden for a credit institution to make non-cash payments or transfers of 
funds aiming at circumventing the restrictive measures.  
Besides the imposition of capital controls, the rescue package for Cyprus involved a hair-
cut on demand deposits exceeding €100,000 in value per account. These funds were 
used to recapitalize the Bank of Cyprus, while Laiki Bank, the second largest Cypriot 
bank, was liquidated. At the same time, the terms of the support scheme included ditch-
ing Greek financial support.  
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2.4.5 The Case of Greece  
The roadmap of capital controls imposed on Greece involved five phases. (see 
Monokroussos et al. 2016). In what follows we go over the first phase only.  
Phase 1 (June 28, 2015-July 19, 2015) 
The measures taken during the first phase of capital controls in Greece were the follow-
ing  
• A Bank Holiday was imposed on credit institutions, which had operations in 
Greece.  The bank holiday was also applied to branches of foreign credit insti-
tutions operating in Greece (based on Law 4261/2014). According to length of 
this Holiday, all banking institutions remained closed to the public from June 
29 until the aftermath of the referendum, which took place on July 5, 2015 
• The bank holiday was also applied to branches of foreign credit institutions 
operating in Greece (based on Law 4261/2014 
• The cash withdrawal limit was set at € 60 for each account per day. However, 
credit cards issued outside Greece were not subject to the above limitations 
• All capital outflows from the country were restricted or banned. No re-
strictions were place, though, on capital inflows into the Greek Sovereignty. 
• Time deposits had to mature at the date of their maturity, and no possibility 
of early withdrawal was allowed. 
• Unrestricted transactions with credit cards and debit cards were permissible 
for payment purposes within the country, i.e. for payments through crediting 
on checking accounted maintained in a Greek financial institution. In addition, 
payments were allowed only through the use of prepaid cards, but exclusively 
up to an amount appearing as a balance before the onset the bank holiday. 
However, new prepaid cards could not be issued. 
• Remote banking transactions, like e-banking or phone-banking transactions, 
were allowed for payments within it country, i.e. for payments on checking 
accounts held in Greece. 
• Cash withdrawals from Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) were allowed 
through cards issued abroad. 
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The exceptions to the above include the clearing of transactions, which had been regis-
tered in their respective central payment systems (TARGET2-GR, EURO1, DIAS) and set-
tlements (like, for example, the Athens Central Depository). During the bank holiday, no 
other banking work could be carried.   
Finally, we need to point that the Banking Transactions Approval Committee was es-
tablished, in the General Accounting Office, in order to approve or disapprove transac-
tions, which were deemed necessary for the wider social interest, like for example pay-
ments for expenses, and payments for the import of important, for the public heath, 
pharmaceutical products.  
 
 
Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discuss the statistical methods that shall be used in order to derive our 
conclusions. The underlying idea of these methods involve the event-study methodol-
ogy.  
In finance research, an “event” is usually the public announcement of a corporate action 
by a public listed firm. An “event” could also be some other announcements which made 
by a third party. For example, credit agencies, like Moody’s , S&P and Fitch, may change 
credit rating for the public listed companies, due to the changing default risk underline.  
An event study can also be used to test in what way the imposition of capital controls in 
Cyprus the stock market. But since we deal with only one “event”, i.e. the namely the 
case of Cyprus, a standard application of the event study methodology cannot be ap-
plied   
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3.1 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY AND THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
3.1 The Standard Design of an Event Study  
Consider Fig. 1, which illustrates, with a time line, the timing sequence normally to be 
encountered in an event study.  
The first specification in an event study is that of the “event window” and the “estima-
tion window”.  Let 𝐿est = 𝑡𝑢 − 𝑡𝑙  and 𝐿eve = 𝜏𝑢 − 𝜏𝑙 be the length of the estimation 
window and the event window respectively. Even if the event being considered is an 
announcement on given date it is typical to set the event window length to be larger 
than one.  
Day ‘0’ is defined as the day of a hypothetical event for a given security. For each security 
a maximum of 𝑇max daily return observations is used for the period around its respective 
event, starting at day 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑙and ending at day 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑢 relative to the event. The first 𝑡𝑢 −
𝑡𝑙  in this period are designated as the ‘estimation period’, and the following 11 days (- 5 
through + 5) is designated the ‘event period’. 
 
Figure 1: Event Study Methodology  
Source: author 
The purpose of “event study” is to examine the stock price or bond price change for a 
given “event”. According to efficient market hypothesis, stock price (also bond price) 
incorporates all available information. How do we know which part of price change is 
𝑡𝑙 
Estimation Window 
𝑡𝑢 
Event Period  
𝜏𝑙 𝜏𝑢 
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due the “event”, not other information? For example, if a major macroeconomic event 
hits the economy, then all shares in the stock market either increase or fall in tandem.  
Hence, as to “isolate” the effect of an “event” on the price of a share, we cannot use the 
actual return for event study research directly. Rather, the abnormal return is employed 
in event study to measure the impact of an “event” on the price change.   
The Abnormal Return (AR) is defined as the difference between the actual return and 
normal return (if the “event” does not take place). For example, if a positive shock hits 
the economy, and as a result all shares in the stock market soar, by say 7%, then, a stock 
with a beta coefficient of 1 should also land a periodic share price return of 7%.  Now in 
order to isolate the effect an event, say, for example the company announcing a profit 
warning, which cause the actual share price to rise by 3% only, we work out the abnor-
mal return, which in this case turns out to be -4% (= 3% - 7%).  
For any sample security 𝑖, the return on that security for time period t relative to the 
event, (𝑅𝑖𝑡), is defined as follows:  
, , ,i t i t i tR K    
3.1  
where 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the “normal”, or expected, or predicted return given a particular (equilib-
rium) model of expected returns, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the component of returns which is abnormal 
or unexpected. Given this return decomposition, the abnormal return, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, is the 
difference between the observed return and the predicted, or normal, return, that is, : 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐾𝑖𝑡 
= 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛦(𝑅𝑖) 
3.2  
Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) the expected return on share 𝑖. There several options to calculate the ex-
pected return for security 𝑖. The first, and simpler way, is to simply calculate the histor-
ical average return of the stock over the estimation window of length, 𝐿est = 𝑡𝑢 − 𝑡𝑙,  
that is, we estimate  
  ,
1 u
l
t t
i i t
t test
E R R
L


   
3.3  
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For example, if day 0 is designated as “event” day, and we may collect, say, 120 daily 
returns, in the estimation window of (-120,-1), prior to the “event”, and  calculate the 
average daily return in those 120 trading days. If the average daily return, in the afore-
mentioned estimation window is, say, 3%, then the “normal return” (if the event does 
not occur) at day 0 should also be 3%. Some theoretical backgrounds may support the 
use of this approach: share price is time correlated; “mean reversion “of stock return 
and so on. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) show that results based on this model do 
not systematically deviate from results based on more sophisticated models for analys-
ing short-term event studies.  
The above approach is consistent with the constant-mean-return model, according to 
the which, the periodic return of stock 𝑖, 𝑅𝑖𝑡, depends on a constant mean return (𝜇𝑖) 
plus a random variable 𝑈𝑖𝑡 with zero mean and constant variance (i.e.   var (𝑈𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑖
2 
for all 𝑡 in the estimation window.  
 
Each firm 𝑖 has 𝐿eve abnormal returns over the event window, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, for 𝑡 = 𝜏𝑙 , 𝜏𝑙 +
1, … , 𝜏𝑢,.     
Then there are two different alternatives of aggregating the abnormal returns that are 
commonly used in event study analyses (see Table 2). The first way involves aggregation 
of abnormal returns across time for each firm 𝑖, across the event window [𝜏𝑙, 𝜏𝑢].  This 
type of aggregation yields 𝑁 average abnormal returns, 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖(𝜏𝑙, 𝜏𝑢), for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁,  
firms . The average abnormal return is used to examine whether mean abnormal returns 
for periods around the event is equal to zero. Since the event window is a multi-period 
window, we may estimate, for each security 𝑖, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
over the event window. 
 ,
u
l
t
i l u it
t
CAR AR


 


  
3.4  
This type of aggregation yields 𝑁 cumulative abnormal returns, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏𝑙, 𝜏𝑢), for 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁, where, as it has been pointed out, 𝜏𝑙 stands for the lower end of the event 
window and 𝜏𝑢 stands for the upper end of the window  
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Table 2: Event Study Statistics 
Firm  
 
Abnormal Return over Event 
Window 
Average ARs across Time  
[𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝝉𝒍, 𝝉𝒖)] 
𝝉𝒍 ⋯ 𝝉𝒖 
1 𝐴𝑅1,𝜏𝑙  ⋯ 𝐴𝑅1,𝜏𝑢  𝐶𝐴𝑅1(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅1,𝒕
𝝉𝒖
𝑡=𝝉𝟏
 
2 𝐴𝑅2,𝜏𝑙 ⋯ 𝐴𝑅2,𝜏𝑢  
𝐶𝐴𝑅2(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
= ∑ 𝐴𝑅2,𝒕
𝑡=𝝉𝟐
𝑡=𝝉𝟏
 
⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋮ ⋮ 
𝛮 𝐴𝑅𝑁,𝜏𝑙 ⋯ 𝐴𝑅𝑁,𝜏𝑢 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑁(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
= ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝛮,𝒕
𝑡=𝝉𝟐
𝑡=𝝉𝟏
 
Aver-
age 
ARs 
across 
Firms  
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝜏𝑙
=
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏𝑙
𝑵
𝑖=𝟏
 
⋯ 
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝜏𝑢
=
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏𝑢
𝑵
𝑖=𝟏
 
 
 
The second way involves aggregation of abnormal returns cross-sectionally for each pe-
riod over the event window [𝜏𝑙, 𝜏𝑢]. This type of aggregation yields and 𝐿eve = 𝜏𝑢 − 𝜏𝑙 
abnormal returns, 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝜏𝑙, 𝐴𝑅
̅̅ ̅̅
𝜏𝑙+1, … , 𝐴𝑅
̅̅ ̅̅
𝜏𝑢, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, where, as it has been pointed 
out.  
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Statistical tests of abnormal returns are commonly based on the cross-average of each 
measure. For cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) the cross-sectional average and vari-
ance are defined as follows: 
   1 2 1 2
1
1
, ,i
i
N
CARCA
N
R    

   
3.5  
 
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
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3.6  
And the cross-sectional T test will be  
 
 
1 2
1 2var
,
,
T
CAR
CAR
 
 

 
 
 
3.7  
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the mean day 𝑡 excess return (e.g., the sim-
ple average of excess returns) is equal to zero. The test statistic is the ratio of the day 
‘𝑡’ mean excess return to its estimated standard deviation; 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 
 ˆ
t
t
AR
Tets
S AR
  
 
 
Where  
,
1
1 t
i N
i t
it
tAR AR
N


   
 
The aggregation is along two dimensions— through time and across securities. We 
will first consider aggregation through time for an individual security and then will 
consider aggregation both across securities and through time. The concept of a cu-
mulative abnormal return is necessary to accommodate a multiple period event win-
dow. 
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Given the null distributions of the abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal 
return, tests of the null hypothesis can be conducted 
,
1
1
AR
N
i
i
AR
N
 

    
3.1  
 
Using these estimates, the abnormal returns for any event period can be analyzed. 
The average abnormal returns can then be aggregated over the event window using 
the same approach as that used to calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each 
security i.  
3.2The Econometric Model 
Given the above discussion, we define the event window, as the period under which 
controls on capital outflows were in place, and the estimation window as the time-pe-
riod under which the economy did not have any capital controls. Hence the relevant 
econometric model that can be estimated is the following   
0 1 it it ity d      
3.8  
Where  
 iy : The value of the dependent variable 𝑖 (for example, the value of the Cypriot 
stock market index) at time-period 𝑡 
t : A normally distributed random variable  
 id : A dummy variable defined as follows  
0, for  without capital controls
1, for   with capital controls
i
i
d
i

 

 
3.9  
Assuming that 𝑦𝑖𝑡 stands for the value or return of the stock market in day 𝑡, then in the 
above econometric model, the parameter 𝛽1 would show the difference in the average 
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daily value or return of the stock market index before and after the implementation of 
capital controls (on outflows). Assuming the distribution of the disturbance condition is 
normal, the t-statistic of ?̂?1is used to examine the null hypothesis 𝛨0: 𝛽1 = 0  of capital 
controls having no statistically significant impact on the value of the dependent variable, 
against the alternative hypothesis 𝛨1: 𝛽1 ≠ 0, in which case we conclude that the impo-
sition of capital controls did affect the Cypriot stock market.  
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Chapter 4: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
This chapter presents the empirical evidence concerning the effect of capital controls in 
the case of the Cypriot stock exchange.  
Section 4.1 examines the effects of capital controls on the market capitalization of the 
Cypriot stock exchange. Specifically, it presents the results from fitting model (3.1) along 
with the decomposition of the relevant time series. The decomposition of a time series 
means refers to its separation into its constituent components, which are usually a trend 
component, an irregular component, and a seasonal component. 
Section 4.2 looks at the effects of capital controls on the daily index value and returns 
of the Cypriot stock market general index.  
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4.1 THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON THE CAPITALIZATION OF THE CYPRIOT 
STOCK EXCHNAGE  
We start by looking at the effects of capital controls on the market capitalization of the 
Cypriot stock exchange. We examine daily average market capitalization of the Cypriot 
stock exchange over the period 2011:01-2016:12.  
Since the market capitalization involves a monthly time series, it is customary first to 
look at the decomposition of the time series into a macroscopic component and a mi-
croscopic component. The macroscopic component can usually be described through a 
trend or seasonality, whereas the microscopic component includes all other compo-
nents. Formally, we can write that the time series {𝑌𝑡} is decomposed as follows   
t t t t tY T S C N     4.1  
Where 𝑇 denotes the trend of the time series. If we believe that the time series {𝑌𝑡}will 
increase in constant absolute amounts each time-period, we can predict 𝑌𝑡by fitting a 
linear trend model  
1 2tY c c t   4.2  
 
According to the above model the value of 𝑌𝑡 in period 𝑡 + 1 is given by 𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑐1 +
𝑐2(𝑡 + 1). So, the change in ty is 21 cyyy ttt   . In other words, the value of 
𝑌𝑡+1will be higher than 𝑌𝑡 by c2. 
The seasonality (𝑆) is the effect that affects the observations negatively or positively 
over the time, for example the consumption of water during the summer period could 
be increased due to extreme heat but during the winter it may decrease. In the time 
series analysis there is a way to remove the systematic influences that are happening 
over the time and affects the observations and it is called seasonal adjustment. The 
observed data may need to be seasonally adjusted because seasonal effects may con-
ceal the true underlying tendency movement in the series.  
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Sometimes is almost impossible to remove seasonality because the observations in the 
time series may be “dominates by the trend or irregular components” (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2008). The identification of the seasonality is possible by observing 
and identifying the regularly spaced peaks (the top point of an economic cycle) and 
troughs (the lowest point of an economic cycle), “which have a consistent direction and 
approximately the same magnitude every year”.  
Fig. 2 is showing a strongly seasonal series. After the seasonality and trend components 
in a time series analysis have been estimated and removed the irregular component (𝑁) 
which is also known as the residual is what remains.  
Figure 2: Decomposition of the Average Market Capitalization of the Cypriot Stock 
Exchange  
Source: Cyprus Stock Exchange (monthly statistical bulletins) for the data 
and author’s calculations  
 
When we deal with a seasonal time series that can be described using an additive model, 
we can seasonally adjust the time series having estimated the seasonal component (of 
the time series), and then subtracting this component from the original time series. Fig. 
3 and Fig.4 show the increase in market capitalization volatility in during the period of 
capital controls  
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Figure 3: Daily Average Market Capitalization of the Cypriot Stock Exchange  
Source: Cyprus Stock Exchange (monthly statistical bulletins) and author’s 
calculations  
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Figure 4: Monthly Change of Daily Average Market Capitalization of the Cypriot Stock 
Exchange  
Source: Cyprus Stock Exchange (monthly statistical bulletins) and author’s calculations  
 
Table 2 presents the results concerning the effects of capital controls on the market 
capitalization, its percentage change, and on cumulative percentage changes, of the 
Cypriot Stock Exchange  
Table 3: The Effects of Capital Controls on the Stock Market Capitalization of the Cyp-
riot Stock Exchange  
 Intercept Estimate  Slope Estimate  
Market Capitalization  
(million euros) 
659.9* 10.14 
Market Capitalization (sea-
sonally adjusted) 
(million euros) 
660.7* 7.83 
Monthly Percentage Change 
of Market Capitalization  1.41 0.14 
Cumulative Monthly Percent-
age Change of Market Capi-
talization  
1.15* -0.011 
Monthly Change of Market 
Capitalization  9.64 -3.67 
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The results of the above table can be interpreted as follows. The estimation of the inter-
cepts parameter ?̂?0 = 659.89 indicates that the average daily stock market capitaliza-
tion of the Cypriot stock exchange index before the imposition of capital controls stood 
at round 660 million. Then during the imposition of capital controls, i.e. over the period 
from 2013/03 to 2015/04, the estimated slope parameter ?̂?1 = 10.14, indicates that the 
average daily market capitalization of the Cypriot stock market increased by 10.14 mil-
lion, in which case it reached 670(= 659.98 + 10.14) million. However, since the esti-
mate of ?̂?1 = 10.14 is not statistically significant we can conclude that the stock market 
capitalization of remained unaffected by the imposition of capital controls, that is, it 
remained close to 660 million. 
When it comes on the effect of the monthly percentage change in the stock-market’s 
capitalization, the estimated intercept parameter ?̂?0 = 1.42 indicates that on average 
the percentage change of the market capitalization of the Cypriot stock exchange index 
before the imposition of capital controls was 1.42. Then during the imposition of capital 
controls, i.e. over the period from 2013:03  to 2015:04, the estimated slope parameter 
?̂?1 = 0.14, indicates that this average percentage change increased by just 0.14 per-
centage point, but this increase was small and at the same time statistically insignificant, 
and hence we can conclude that the percentage change of stock market capitalization 
was not affected by the imposition of capital controls. 
Then we look at the effect on cumulative monthly percentage change in the stock-mar-
ket’s capitalization. The estimated intercept parameter of ?̂?0 = 1.15 indicates that the 
average cumulative percentage change of the market capitalization of the Cypriot stock 
exchange index before the imposition of capital controls was 15%. Then during the im-
position of capital controls, i.e. over the period from 2013/03  to 2015/04, the estimated 
slope parameter ?̂?1 = −0.01, indicates that this average percentage change decreased 
by just 1 percentage point, but this decreased was very small and at the same time sta-
tistically insignificant; hence we can conclude that the cumulative percentage change of 
stock market capitalization was not affected by the imposition of capital controls. 
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4.2 THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON THE CYPRIOT STOCK MARKET INDEX  
Next, we examine the effect of capital controls on the Cypriot stock market by looking 
at the effects on the general stock market index.  
Fig. 7 shows the daily values of the main Cypriot stock market index over the period 
2013:01-2016:12. Table 2 presents the results concerning the effects of capital controls 
on the main stock market index in the Cypriot Stock Exchange  
 
Figure 5: The Cypriot Main Stock Market Index 
Source: Naftemporiki 
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Figure 6: The Decomposition of the Cypriot Main Stock Market Index 
Source: Naftemporiki 
 
Figure 7: The Deseasonalized Cypriot Main Stock Market Index 
Source: Naftemporiki 
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Figure 8: The Cypriot Main Stock Market Index Returns  
Source: Naftemporiki and Author’s calculations  
 
 
Figure 9: The Cypriot Main Stock Market Index Volatility  
Source: Naftemporiki and Author’s calculations  
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Table 4: The Effects of Capital Controls on the Cypriot Stock Exchange  
 Intercept Estimate  Slope Estimate  
Index Returns (%) -0.070 0.046 
Index Value  74.34* 27.51* 
Index Value (seasonality ad-
justed) 71.04* 27.79* 
30-Day Index Return Volatility 
(%) 0.82* 1.02* 
 
We start the discussion with the values of the stock market. From the estimation of the 
parameter ?̂?0 = 73.65 we see that the average daily value of the Cypriot stock exchange 
index before the imposition of capital controls was 73.65. Then during the imposition of 
capital controls, i.e. over the period from Mar 25,2013 to Apr 06,2015, given the esti-
mated slope parameter ?̂?1 = 28.20, the average daily return on the Cypriot stock mar-
ket index increased to 101.85(= 73.65 + 28.20) 
 
From the estimation of the parameter ?̂?0 = −0.0381 we see that the average daily re-
turn of the Cypriot stock exchange index before the imposition of capital controls stood 
at round -0.0381%. Then during the imposition of capital controls, ie over the period 
from Mar 25,2013 to Apr 06,2015, given the estimated slope parameter ?̂?1 = 0.01394, 
the average daily return of the Cypriot stock market −0.0241(= −0.0381 + 0.01394) 
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Then we examine the results for the values of the stock market. From the estimation of 
the parameter ?̂?0 = 73.65 we see that the average daily value of the Cypriot stock ex-
change index before the imposition of capital controls was 73.65. Then during the im-
position of capital controls, ie over the period from Mar 25,2013 to Apr 06,2015, given 
the estimated slope parameter ?̂?1 = 28.20, the average daily return on the Cypriot 
stock market index increased to 101.85(= 73.65 + 28.20) 
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Chapter 5: CONLUSIONS  
When the financial crisis hit Cyprus, the weak link turned out to be the country’s banking 
system and its exposure to the Greek economy. As a result, the "haircut" to the private 
bondholders of Greek bonds (PSIs), completely dented the balance sheets of Cypriot 
banks.  
 
In any another country, the capital control measures would have no significant conse-
quences as since transactions are carried out predominantly not with cash, but with 
debit cards and credit cards. But this is not the case in Greece, and hence private con-
sumption was dented, as Greek households had to make ends meet only with the cash 
balances were allowed to withdraw from the banking system. 
The rational for the imposition of capital controls was to force Greek residents to keep 
their euros within the Greek economy. This did not pose a big problem for the Greek 
consumer, since he would have either to find a substitute product in the Greek market 
(probably at a higher price and of less quality) or he would have to do without it. But 
capital controls did pose a serious threat for Greek enterprises, since the overwhelming 
majority of them   have to import their raw materials.  
Although (the Greek) capital controls did not completely restricted the companies’ abil-
ity to trade with the foreign sector, each business transaction however did become quite 
time-consuming, as a long bureaucratic process of approval was required in order for 
such transactions to be allowed, and, added to that, the amount of the transaction could 
not surpass a certain ceiling. So, the Greek firms with sufficiently accumulated capital, 
could slow down their operations without having to lay off part of their personnel, but 
those firms with deficient capital buffers were forced to proceed with forced leave of 
absences for their employees or even layoffs.   
At any rate, the impart of capital controls on the Greek economy was profound, leading 
to the collapse of many businesses, and hence, under no circumstances, should be ever 
repeated again. 
  -37- 
Bibliography 
1. Blundell-Wignall. A. and Roulet., C. (2013). “Capital Controls on Inflows, the 
Global Financial Crisis and Economic Growth: Evidence for Emerging Econon 
nies” Journal: Financial Market Trends Volume 2013/2 
2. Cyprus Stock Exchange (2016). Monthly Statistical Bulletin N.13. 
3. Cyprus Stock Exchange (2015). Monthly Statistical Bulletin N.13. 
4. Cyprus Stock Exchange (2014). Monthly Statistical Bulletin N.13. 
5. Cyprus Stock Exchange (2013). Monthly Statistical Bulletin N.13. 
6. Cyprus Stock Exchange (2012). Monthly Statistical Bulletin N.13. 
7. Cyprus Stock Exchange (2011). Monthly Statistical Bulletin N.13. 
8. Forbes, K., and Warnock, F. (2011). “Capital Flow Waves: Surges, Stops, Flight, 
and Retrenchment.” NBER Working Paper No. 17351. 
9. Glick, R., X. Guo, and Hutchison, M. (2006). “Currency Crises, Capital Account Lib-
eralization and Selection Bias.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 88 (2). 
10. Klein, Michael. 2012. “Capital Controls: Gates Versus Walls” NBER Working 
Paper 18526, Cambridge, MA 
11. Korinek, A, (2011). The Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research 
Agenda, IMF Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 523-561. 
12. Magud, Nicolas, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2011). “Capital Con-
trols: Myth and Reality – A Portfolio Balance Approach,” NBER Working Paper 
No. 16805. 
13. Monokroussos. P., Dimitriadou, A., Gkionis, I., Gogos, S., Petropoulou, P., Sta-
matiou, T. (2016) One year capital controls in Greece Impact on the domestic 
economy & lessons from the Cypriot experience 
14. Ostry, J., Ghosh, A., Habermeier, K., Chamon, M., Qureshi, M., and Reinhardt, 
D. (2010). “Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls.” IMF 
15.  Pindyck, R., and Rubinfeld, D. (1991). Econometric Models and Economic 
Forecasts. 3rd edition. McGraw-Hill International Editions.  
16. Saborowski, C., Sanya, S., Weisfeld, H., and Yepez, J., (2014). “The Effective-
ness of Capital Outflow Restrictions.” IMF Working Paper 
 
  -38- 
 
 
 
 
   
  -1- 
Appendix 
 
